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ABSTRACT 
This technical report summarizes research into sampling methods that the 
U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) could employ during 
Material Inspections (MIs) of ships and submarines.  The goal is to improve the 
Board’s efficiency in conducting MIs without compromising either Board 
effectiveness or inspection rigor. 
The idea of sampling is that, rather than inspecting every item of a specific 
type—for example, portable CO2 bottles—onboard a ship or submarine, INSURV 
will only inspect a sample of those items.  From the sample, INSURV would then 
characterize the ship’s or submarine’s entire complement of that item. 
This report outlines a sampling methodology that is statistically rigorous 
and therefore quantitatively defensible, and it is implementable.  It is based on 
well-known sampling methods, such as those described in Cochran (1977) and 
Lohr (1999). 
The method described herein allows INSURV to specify the desired 
margin of error of the results on each item.  It is expected that this decision will 
be based on the mission essentiality and/or safety criticality of each item, where 
items that are mission essential or safety critical will be given very small margins 
of error.  Similarly, items that are not mission essential or safety critical will be 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This technical report, in the form of an annotated briefing, summarizes 
research into sampling methods that the U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and 
Survey (INSURV) could employ during Material Inspections (MIs) of ships and 
submarines.  The goal is to improve the Board’s efficiency in conducting MIs 
without compromising either Board effectiveness or inspection rigor. 
The idea of sampling is that, rather than inspecting every item of a specific 
type—for example, portable CO2 bottles—onboard a ship or submarine, INSURV 
will only inspect a sample of those items.  From the sample, INSURV would then 
characterize the ship’s or submarine’s entire complement of that item. 
A good sampling methodology must:  (1) ensure that the sample is 
representative of the population, and (2) the sample size is sufficiently large so 
that the “margin of error” of the results is small.  Furthermore, a successful 
sampling methodology must be: 
 Defensible:  The sampling methodology must be 
analytically/statistically rigorous and it needs to pass the “common 
sense” test (so the Fleet will accept it). 
 Implementable:  It must be easy to apply by inspection teams 
during the inspection process.  That is, the purpose of sampling is 
to make the inspection teams more efficient, not to add a burden to 
the inspection process. 
 Justifiable:  It must result in a sufficient improvement in efficiency 
that more than makes up for the extra complexity it will introduce. 
 Flexible:  Inspectors must have the flexibility to adjust as shipboard 
conditions require.  In particular, the methodology cannot be so 
rigid that it inhibits inspectors from pursuing things they observe 
aboard the platform. 
 Transparent:  Inspectees will need to know that INSURV will not 
necessarily inspect all items, though they need to be prepared for 
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all, and they also will need to be prepared for, and be willing to 
accept, results based on sampling. 
This report outlines a sampling methodology that meets the requirements 
of the first two bullets:  it is statistically rigorous and therefore quantitatively 
defensible, and it is implementable.  It is based on well-known sampling 
methods, such as those described in Cochran (1977) and Lohr (1999). 
The method described herein allows INSURV to specify the desired 
margin of error of the results on each item.  It is expected that this decision will 
be based on the mission essentiality and/or safety criticality of each item, where 
items that are mission essential or safety critical will be given very small margins 
of error.  Similarly, items that are not mission essential or safety critical will be 
given appropriately larger margins of error. 
Based on this choice, as well as other information about each item, such 
as how many are aboard a given platform, the method gives a required sample 
size.  For mission-essential or safety-critical items, particularly when there are 
few of each item aboard the ship or submarine, the method often results in a 
requirement for 100% inspection, which is what INSURV is currently doing.  
However, for non-mission-essential and non-safety-critical items, particularly 
when there are many of the items, the sample size can be considerably smaller 
than the total number of items. 
Whether the sampling method described in this report is justifiable, in the 
sense that the effort of implementing it is worth the benefits of sampling, is a 
question only INSURV can answer.  If the answer is yes, then further 
development and training is required so that INSURV staff and inspectors can 
flexibly implement these methods and subsequently defend and explain the 
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This technical report, presented in the form of an annotated briefing,1 
describes a sampling methodology that the U.S. Navy Board of Inspection and 
Survey (INSURV) could use for ship and submarine Material Inspections (MIs).  It 
is largely based on a draft briefing provided to Mr. Robert Strait, Director of 
Operations Analysis and Chief Information Officer (CIO), Board of Inspection and 
Survey, in September 2011. 
                                                 
1 As an annotated briefing, this report is intended to present in written form how the briefing 
would have been given verbally.  The text under each slide (and sometimes continuing on to the 
next page) documents how each slide would have been described and presented.  In so doing, 
the text sometimes reiterates verbiage from a slide and often amplifies and expands on the 




The purpose of this briefing is to present a rigorous sampling methodology 
that INSURV can employ to improve how the Board conducts MIs.  The goal is to 
improve INSURV’s efficiency in conducting MIs without compromising either 





This briefing introduces the idea of sampling, including discussing the 
arguments in favor of using sampling during MIs.  It then describes a sampling 
methodology for MIs that allows INSURV to correctly and defensibly determine 
how many items to inspect (the sample size) as well as which items to inspect.  
As we will discuss, the methodology is designed to ensure samples are 
representative of the population and sample sizes are set so that the sampling 
“margin of error” is appropriately small. 
That said, this report only presents an overarching sampling methodology.  
It does not discuss or explain how to implement the sampling methodology within 
INSURV’s MIs.  Such implementation will require decisions about which 
platforms, and then which systems within platforms, sampling should be applied 
to.  Perhaps more importantly, successful incorporation of sampling into MIs will 




Before we get into the details of sampling, it is worthwhile to quickly review 
the relevant legislation that established INSURV and the instructions that  
govern it. 
Originally established in 1868, in 1882 Congress enacted legislation that 
placed INSURV under statutory authority.  Title 10 of the U.S. Code now governs 
the Board, though it provides little in the way of detail about how the Board 
should operate. 
OPNAV Instruction 5430.48D, dated 29 March 1993, defines the duties of 
the President, Board of Inspection and Survey (PRESINSURV) as OPNAV 09P 
where, in particular, it says that PRESINSURV coordinates INSURV reports 
“concerning material, performance, and design deficiencies” and “recommends 
appropriate action.”  Key here are the underlined words on the slide:  “material, 




Finally, OPNAV Instruction 5240.70F, dated 7 August 2006, specifies 
INSURV’s mission.  The key text here is underlined, where the clear emphasis of 
INSURV’s mission is on assessing material condition and acquisition and 
maintenance deficiencies.  Nowhere does it say that, in the process of assessing 
material condition, INSURV is required to inspect every item on every platform 
inspected.  Unquestionably, INSURV must correctly, accurately, and defensibly 
determine the material condition of a platform, but how INSURV accomplishes 




The idea of a sampling is that, rather than inspecting every item of a 
specific type—such as CO2 bottles onboard a ship or submarine—INSURV will 
only inspect a sample of those items.  Inherent in this idea is that there is 
sufficient information in the sample from which INSURV can make an accurate 
determination about the material condition of the entire platform with respect to 
the item. 
Of course, the measurement resulting from the examination of a sample 
(e.g., the CO2 bottle EOC score) is unlikely to exactly match the measurement 
that would have occurred had the whole population been inspected.  Thus, the 
goal of a good sampling methodology is to ensure that the EOC score estimated 
from the sample is “close” to the EOC score that would have been determined if 
the entire population had been inspected. 
As we will discuss in this report, there are two critical sampling criteria: 
(1) the sample must be representative of the population, and  
(2) the sample size must be sufficiently large so that the sampling 
“margin of error” is appropriately small. 
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By ensuring these two criteria are achieved, it is possible to have 
confidence that the result from inspecting the sample of items does, indeed, 
reflect the entire shipboard complement of items.  We will return to these ideas, 
first more rigorously defining them, and then discussing how a sampling 





The “margin of error” quantifies the uncertainty inherent in sampling.  
When used in the context of polling results, the margin of error is typically taken 
to mean that the result for the population is highly likely to be within the observed 
result of the poll, plus or minus the margin of error.  While not technically correct, 
it does capture the idea that the margin of error is a measure of the uncertainty 
inherent in the sample. 
Technically, the margin of error is the half-width of a 95% confidence 
interval around the statistic of interest.  So, adding and subtracting the margin of 
error from the EOC score of the sample, say for the CO2 bottles from the 
previous slide, gives an interval within which the population EOC score lies with 
high confidence. 
Perhaps most relevant to this discussion, note that the margin of error 
quantifies the uncertainty in the result.  The larger the margin of error, the more 
likely the result observed from the sample can deviate significantly from what 
would have been observed if the entire population of items had been inspected.  
The good news is that, via the sample size, INSURV can control the margin of 




Consider two examples to illustrate the margin of error idea.  First, 
consider a Rasmussen Reports survey of President Obama.  In it, 1,000 likely 
voters were asked to rate the President, and 42% of them said he is a good or 
excellent leader.  The margin of error for this poll is 3%.  Thus, a 95% confidence 
interval for the percentage of voters in the entire population who think the 
President is a good or excellent leader is from 39% to 45%.  That is, we can be 
highly confident that between 39% and 45% of likely U.S. voters would rate the 
President a good or excellent leader. 
For a (hypothetical) INSURV example, imagine that 50 of 100 CO2 bottles 
were inspected during an MI of the USS Antietam.  Further assume that the 50 
CO2 bottles are representative of the entire population, that the EOC score for 
the 50 bottles is 0.85, and that the margin of error is 0.03.  Then a 95% 
confidence interval for the EOC score for Antietam’s CO2 bottles is from 0.82 to 
0.88.  That is, we can be highly confident that the Antietam should receive a SAT 




There are a number of arguments in favor of using sampling for MIs.  
These include: 
 On a given platform, if it saves man hours that can be more 
effectively used in other inspection areas, it allows for a deeper 
and/or broader assessment of that platform’s material condition. 
 Across the organization, if it eliminates unnecessary man-hours, 
then that frees up INSURV resources that can be used in other 
ways (e.g., MTIAs). 
 Informal sampling currently occurs, where inspectors already 
have/take the discretion to choose which items they inspect and to 
what level of detail. 
 It’s generally the preparation for the inspection, not the inspection 
itself, which results in improved material condition.  Regardless, the 
Board’s function is not to improve the material readiness of the 
Fleet, but rather to document the material condition. 
 It’s often not necessary to inspect every item to make an adequate 




There are two ways to think about how INSURV might apply sampling.  
The first we’ll call “within platform” sampling, which means that the sampling will 
be applied to items from one ship or submarine during its MI.  This is the type of 
sampling we’ve been discussing thus far with the CO2 bottle example. 
However, “between platform” sampling may also be of interest.  Here the 
idea is that certain items are only inspected on some ships or submarines, not all 
of them.  Obviously, this type of sampling is not relevant to MIs, but it could be 
useful if INSURV was tasked with assessing Fleet readiness for some item or 
program that is not part of an MI.  Under these conditions, it may not be 
necessary to inspect every item on every platform, but rather only a sample  
of platforms. 
In any case, since this report is concerned with how sampling might apply 




Before continuing, it is important to lay out the principles that a sampling 
scheme should meet if it is to be applied by INSURV to MIs.  Such a sampling 
scheme must be: 
 Defensible: The sampling methodology must be 
analytically/statistically rigorous and it needs to pass the “common 
sense” test (so the Fleet will accept it). 
 Implementable:  It must be easy to apply by inspection teams 
during the inspection process.  That is, one purpose of sampling is 
to make the inspection teams more efficient, not to add a burden to 
the inspection process. 
 Flexible:  Inspectors must have the flexibility to adjust as 
conditions on the ground require.  In particular, the methodology 
cannot be so rigid that it inhibits inspectors from pursuing things 
they observe during an MI. 
 Justifiable:  It must result in a sufficient improvement in efficiency 
that more than makes up for the extra complexity it will introduce.  
Furthermore, from an INSURV organizational standpoint, sampling 
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is only a benefit if it eliminates resources that are required for 
material inspections. 
• Transparent:  Inspectees need to know that INSURV will not 
necessarily inspect all items, though they need to be prepared for 
all.  They also will need to be prepared for, and be willing to accept, 





As previously mentioned, there are two critical criteria for valid sampling: 
 First, the sample must be representative of the population.  That is, 
it cannot be focused on any particular subset, say by location, or 
division.  Representativeness is usually achieved by randomly 
sampling from among all the items aboard a platform (i.e., the 
“population”) according to specific guidelines that we will discuss. 
 Second, the sample must also be of sufficiently large size to ensure 
an appropriately small “margin of error.”  The margin of error itself 
should be a function of the criticality of the item being inspected.  
Thus, items with higher criticality should also have larger sample 
sizes, while items with lower criticality should have smaller  
sample sizes. 
Much of the rest of this report will be about how to determine the 




The correct sample size for a particular inspection evolution is dependent 
on three quantities.  First, it is dependent on the total number of items that could 
be inspected, which we call the size of the population.  Second, it is dependent 
on the measurement variation in the population, meaning how much the items 
themselves vary in terms of the measurements being taken or observed.  And, 
third, the sample size depends on the desired margin of error. 
Of these, only the margin of error is within INSURV’s control (indeed, it 
should be specified by INSURV).  For the other two, the population size (which is 
usually denoted by a capital letter N) is simply the number of items that are 
installed or aboard the ship or submarine being inspected.  The variation in the 
population, measured in terms of the standard deviation—usually denoted by —
of the EOC score for that item, is a function of how that particular item is 
operated, maintained, and probably a host of other factors. 
The key point is that N and  are simply a function of what exist onboard 
the platform being inspected.  The population size N, at least for most items, 
should be known precisely before the MI, while the EOC standard deviation will 
have to be estimated, probably from historical data. 
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In particular, the population standard deviation  is usually estimated by 
the sample standard deviation, denoted by s, and it is calculated in the usual way.  
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An important point to note is that, for a fixed population size N, populations 
that are more variable (i.e., have greater EOC standard deviations) will require 
larger sample sizes to achieve a desired margin of error (compared to an 
equivalent population with a smaller EOC standard deviation). 
Now, while s is continuous and, at least theoretically can take on any 
nonnegative value, for the purposes of the calculations in this briefing, we will 
discretize s into four levels and base the sample size calculations on these four 
levels.  As shown in the slide, we call these levels “low,” “moderate,” “high,” and 
“very high” population variations.  For the purposes of this report, they are 
defined as EOC standard deviations of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively. 
These EOC standard deviation levels were derived from a brief analysis of 
some MI data for the CG-47 class. 
Alternatively, INSURV can use the precise values of s for each item.  This 
will require using the equation on Slide 19 to determine the required sample size, 
rather than the tabulated values we will discuss shortly. 
Should INSURV decide to implement a sampling scheme, a more rigorous 
analysis of these levels should be undertaken to ensure they are the most 
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relevant.  Then, during implementation, they should be used conservatively, 
meaning that sample size determinations should be based on rounding up to the 





As we discussed, the sample size is a function of the margin of error, 
which INSURV would set.  All other things being equal, a smaller margin of error 
will result in a larger sample size.  At the extreme, a zero margin of error results 
in 100% inspection—i.e., all the items in the population must be inspected.  This 
is where INSURV currently operates. 
However, a zero margin of error may not be necessary for all inspection 
items and, in fact, the margin of error should be driven by the criticality of the 
item being inspected.  That is, for mission-critical items, where it is vital that 
INSURV measures the population with a high degree of accuracy, there should 
be a small margin of error (resulting in a large sample size, which could be the 
entire population).  On the other hand, for non-mission-critical items, a larger 
margin of error may be acceptable, which could result in not all the items  
being inspected. 
To simplify the sample size calculations, we use four margins of error 
levels, which we characterize as “very low,” “low,” “moderate,” and “high.”  These 
correspond to margins of error of 1%, 3%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
20 
 
As with the EOC standard deviation, INSURV does not have to use these 
particular margin of error levels.  Doing so facilitates the use of the tables that we 
will discuss shortly (on Slide 18), but the equation on Slide 19 can be used to 





This slide shows some examples of population variation and possible 
margins of error.  The population variation (i.e., the EOC standard deviations) 
were calculated from the MIDATA Warehouse using CG-47 MI data from years 
2009-2011 by searching on key word, calculating the EOC standard deviation for 
each hull, and then reporting the median EOC standard deviation. 
However, it is important to note that this is not the right data to use since it 
is only comprised of deficiencies.  The correct calculation should use information 
on the entire population, which includes both deficient and nondeficient items.  
Thus, these examples are likely underestimating the total population variation.  
Nonetheless, they are included here for illustrative purposes. 
The margins of error are also illustrative, but they show how  
mission-critical items such as mission-essential and safety equipment should 
have low margins of error, while non-mission-essential equipment, such as 




So, with that as background, how to calculate the sample size?  There are 
three steps in the process.  First, determine the population size N and the 
variability s of the item.  These quantities follow from class knowledge and 
historical data.  Second, decide on the margin of error.  This is simply INSURV’s 
choice based on the criticality of the inspection item.  Finally, look up the required 




This slide is the table of required sample sizes, one for each level of 
population variability s.  Given s, each table is a function of the margin of error m 
and the population size N.  Simply enter the appropriate table and read off the 
sample size for the population size N and the desired margin of error m. 
For example, consider an item with an EOC variation of s=0.4 (“very high”), 
a population size of N=100, and a desired margin of error of m=0.1 (10% or 
“high”).  For this item the required sample size is 40.  That is, under these 
conditions, only 40% of the items need to be inspected.  In contrast, for an item 
with an EOC variation of s=0.1 (“low”), a population size of N=10, and a margin of 
error of m=0.01 (1% or “very low”), the required sample size is 10.  That is, under 
these conditions, a 100% inspection is required. 
For population sizes in between those listed in the tables, nonograms are 
provided at the end of this briefing (Slides 31-34) that give the results for any 




This slide shows the formula behind the sample size calculations that give 
the results in the tables on Slide 18 (and the nomograms on Slides 31-34).  Note 
how the sample size is related to the various parameters s, N, and m: 
 As the standard deviation in the population s gets larger (all else 
staying constant), a larger sample size n is required to achieve the 
same margin of error. 
 Similarly, as the population size N increases (all else staying 
constant), a larger sample size n is required to achieve the same 
margin of error. 
 To achieve a smaller margin of error m (again, holding all else 




As we discussed earlier, there are two important considerations in 
implementing a rigorous sampling scheme.  One is the determination of the 
sample size.  The second is the methodology for selecting a representative 
sample.  Intuitively, a representative sample must allow each item to be in the 
sample.  That is, it cannot arbitrarily eliminate specific items from being sampled.  
In addition, the methodology should ensure that the sample comes from 
throughout the ship or platform. 
A critical consideration is that the sampling methodology must eliminate 
human judgment from the sample selection process.  There is an important 
reason for this, namely that if the sample selection is left up to human judgment, 
then it is possible for conscious or subconscious biases to creep into the sample.  
For example, an inspector may tend to focus on items that are likely to be 
defective, thereby lowering the estimated EOC.  Or perhaps another inspector 
decides to only sample easily available items, which also just happened to have 
better maintenance for the same reason, thereby overestimating the EOC. 
These statistical issues aside, it’s also the only way to defend against 
allegations that the inspector chose a biased sample, biased either for or against 
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the platform.  That is, a formal methodology for selecting the sample that is 
outside the inspector’s control also gives the inspectors a defense against 





A sampling strategy that meets the criteria on the previous slide and is 
also easy to implement is called systematic sampling.  A simple example will 
make the idea clear.  Imagine a population of N=100 items with a required sample 
size of n=10.  A systematic sample results if the inspector chooses a random item 
to start with and then inspects every tenth item after it. 
The calculation gets a little more complicated than that if the population 
size divided by the sample size (N/n) is not an integer, or if n is more than 50% of 
N.  In the former case, the solution, as shown in the slide above, is to round N/n 
down to the next lowest integer.  For example, if n=10.2, simply round it down  
to 10. 
In the latter case, the calculation is shown in the last bullet of the slide 
above, where the idea is to determine which items to skip and not inspect.  As a 
simple example, imagine the case where N=9 and n=6.  Then N/(N-n)=3 and 
every third item would be skipped and not inspected.  For example, if the items 
are numbered 1,2,…,9 and the inspector picked item 5 to start, then he or she 





Let’s look at an example that brings it all together.  In this case, it’s the 
inspection of racks in one berthing compartment in support of Event ID 
HAB0010.  The scenario is that the compartment has N=50 racks, for which an 
analysis of data from previous ships of the same class gives an EOC standard 
deviation of s=0.1, and INSURV determines that the margin of error for this 
inspection item should be “moderate,” so m=0.05. 
Under these conditions, the table on Slide 18 gives a sample size of n=13 
racks.  Thus, we have that N/n=50/13=3.8.  Rounding this down gives k=3, so the 
inspector would chose a random rack to start with and then inspect every third 




Here’s another example, where the Event is ID DC0350, to inspect the 
watertight doors throughout the platform.  In this scenario, there are N=200 
watertight doors, for which an analysis of data from previous ships of the same 
class gives an EOC standard deviation of s=0.2, and INSURV determines that the 
margin of error for this inspection item should be “low,” so m=0.03. 
Under these conditions, the table on Slide 18 gives a sample size of n=95 
doors.  Thus, we have that N/n=200/95=2.1.  Rounding this down gives k=2, so 
the inspector would choose a random watertight door to start with and then 




As a third and final example, consider the Event is ID WP0130, to inspect 
the CIWS.  In this scenario, there are N=2 CIWS, for which an analysis of data 
from previous ships of the same class gives an EOC standard deviation of s=0.3, 
and INSURV determines that the margin of error for this inspection item should 
be “very low,” so m=0.01.  Under these conditions, the table on Slide 18 gives a 




Now, there are some real-world complications that need to be addressed 
in the implementation of systematic sampling.  The first is that the items have to 
have some type of natural ordering in order to be able to inspect every kth item.  
For example, what does it mean to an inspector on the deckplates to inspect 
“every other” watertight door?  To implement such a sampling scheme, it would 
probably be necessary to devise some type of route around the ship or 
submarine over which the inspector would stop and inspect every other 
watertight door as he or she comes to it on the route. 
The second complication is that the frequency of items to inspect (or skip) 
must not match up with some systematic feature of the items being inspected.  In 
the rack inspection example, for example, racks often come in tiers of three, so 
inspecting “every third” rack could result in only top or bottom racks  
being inspected. 
In this case, a solution might be that the inspector has to randomly choose 
one rack in each tier to inspect, though a system would need to be put in place to 
remove subjectivity from the choice.  Alternatively, the inspector might simply 
systematically subsample the racks in each tier, perhaps starting with the top 
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rack in the first tier inspected, proceeding to the middle rack in the second tier, to 
the bottom rack in the third tier, and then repeating this pattern for the fourth, fifth, 





A third complication arises if the resulting interval (the EOC score of the 
sample plus and minus the margin of error) straddles two categories, say 
degraded and unsat (e.g., the interval turns out to be 77%-83%).  It’s not clear, 
then, from the results of the sample, whether the item should be given a 
degraded or unsat rating. 
There are two possible solutions for this.  The first is to let the inspection 
team make a subjective call as to how the item is to be rated.  The second is to 
collect more data in order to decrease the margin of error, with the hope that the 
new interval will fall entirely in one rating category or the other. 
The former is consistent with current practice and is probably the 
appropriate solution.  However, it does open the inspection team up to second 
guessing and allegations of bias.  On the other hand, the latter is likely to be 
unworkable in the field, as it would require the inspectors and ship’s force to 
revisit an inspection already seemingly completed.  Furthermore, it’s still possible 
that the new interval will straddle the two rating categories (unless the second 
inspection results in a 100% inspection). 
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A fourth issue that would need to be addressed is the question of how 
much of the sampling calculations should be done by the inspectors during the 





This report has presented a sampling methodology that is statistically 
rigorous and quantitatively defensible.  What it does is allow INSURV to explicitly 
trade off the desired inspection precision of a system against the required 
inspection level of effort.  The current inspection methodology—100% 
inspection—also implicitly makes such a trade-off, requiring maximum precision 
for all systems regardless of whether such a level of precision is necessary  
or appropriate. 
Of course, just because the method is quantitatively defensible does not 
mean it is justifiable to the Fleet, or that the Fleet will find it acceptable.  This is 
not something that can be addressed via statistics; it is a substantive issue that 
only PRESINSURV and Fleet leadership can determine.  And, while the 
methodology is theoretically feasible, additional work is required to understand 
whether there are implementation issues that will need to be addressed.  We 




First, it is important to emphasize that this report only presents an 
overarching sampling methodology.  It does not discuss or explain how to 
implement the sampling methodology within INSURV’s MIs.  Such 
implementation will require decisions about which platforms, and then which 
systems within platforms, sampling should be applied to.  Perhaps more 
importantly, successful incorporation of sampling into MIs will require a  
well-considered implementation plan.  That is, it will be critical to get all deckplate 





Given all the foregoing, should PRESINSURV determine that the sampling 
methodology is still worth pursuing, the next logical step is a limited beta test on 
a small number of non-mission-critical, non-safety systems.  Some of the 
habitability inspections seem like good potential candidates.  The issue is to 
assess how sampling would work under actual shipboard conditions and to 
uncover any real-world impediments to the use of sampling.  For example, as 
described in Slides 25 and 26 (“Some Important Issues to be Resolved”), what 
are all the issues with and barriers to systematic sampling when applied to 
shipboard items?  How should such systematic sampling plans be codified for the 
inspectors?  Will they need to be tailored for each system?  How much flexibility 





Of course, a successful beta test is only the first step in establishing 
sampling as a routine part of MIs.  That is, not only might the methodology need 
to be revised to deal with any issues or complications that are found during the 
beta test, but a set of guidelines and/or instructions will need to be written and 
approved that formalize the program within INSURV.  In addition to the formal 
guidelines, internal operating procedures will need to be established and 
implemented, including defining and establishing any additional analytical 
support capabilities that will be required.  For example, INSURV will need to 
determine who will specify the margins of error and then who will be responsible 
for taking those margins of error and calculating the sample sizes and specifying 
sampling parameters. 
Similarly, once the organizational details have been determined, 
resourced, and implemented, a formal training program should be conducted to 
educate inspectors about how to execute sampling in the field, including how to 
explain and justify it to ship’s force (as necessary/desired).  Also, INSURV will 
need to communicate the new policies and procedures to the Fleet and Navy 
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leadership.  All of this will require careful planning and execution to ensure the 





This is the nomogram for low population variation (s=0.1).  It provides the 






This is the nomogram for low population variation (s=0.2).  It provides the 






This is the nomogram for low population variation (s=0.3).  It provides the 






This is the nomogram for low population variation (s=0.4).  It provides the 
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